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CITY HARD PERIMETER STRATEGY, a force multiplier in an effective counterinsurgency or a mistake?

Why do a few smart, senior Army and Air Force officers think that over thirty of Iraq’s largest and most unstable urban areas lend themselves to having a "modern moat,” one kilometer wide established around these "city islands"?  Would guarding these "wide, dry city-moats" with air weapons give the USA a timely force multiplier?  “What jumps out at you immediately here is the vastness of the territory we oversee,” said Col. A.T. Ball, commander of the 25th ID’s Combat Aviation Brigade. “We’re dealing with the tyranny of distance and time."  http://stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=41668  Would security all over Iraq improve if Ramadi were surrounded by an octagon shaped, one kilometer wide sand moat? 

Would military officials have a powerful capability to keep insurgents from simply melting away or sneaking in?  http://aimpoints.hq.af.mil/display.cfm?id=14557

Across Baghdad, as in other troubled areas of Iraq that American forces have tried to “clear and hold,” military officials have struggled to deal with insurgents simply melting away, only to return stronger after the offensives wound down. 

Maj. Gen. Charles J. Dunlap Jr. offers detailed solutions and capabilities in his article, “America’s Asymmetric Advantage.”  http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/11/2349560  He argues it’s the “kill zone” on the ground which gives the USA an enduring asymmetric advantage over our enemies.  “In short, what real asymmetrical advantage the U.S. enjoys in countering insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan relates to a dimension of air power.”   Shaping the kill zone around urban areas is the key.  For example, during the battle of Fallujah, the ability of the insurgents to escape across the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in small boats meant that most of the fighters escaped - the balance killed were probably seeking martyrdom. The rest simply scattered like rats.  Without using millions of troops, the USA will face the "scattering rat" issue over and over.  Which leads to the question, how does the USA use the air weapon to restrain insurgent movement?  It's the kill zone on the ground that's the key to using the air weapon as a force multiplier. 

After the battle of Fallujah, how were the insurgents able to flee and rebuild their nests 30 miles west of Fallujah and 30 miles closer to Syria, in Anbar's capital, Ramadi?   Why was the air weapon not used?

The answer - the modern equivalent of the "city-moat".  A small historical fact - most moats were dry and flat.  No digging involved. 

What if the Air Force tasked civilian contractors, specifically capable of working autonomously "outside the wire" with a self-contained security package, to use huge, modern mining backhoes capable of digging a 20x20 foot ditch in one scoop?  Imagine a ditch and berm system with a one kilometer wide “kill zone” between the ditch systems? 

http://www.terex.com/main.php?obj=prod&action=VIEW&id=31aaf5da7abd9d89ef2bf6b27570c4af&nav=prod&cid=477c69a0ac11ed40efe034eb1420b8c6

A key question: Is Ramadi the optimal test case for proving the value this unique capability?  Because of the accuracy of U.S. air weapons and the addition of 250 pound guided munitions, does the capability to channel insurgents have future strategic importance beyond Iraq?  Ground commanders have struggled to find choke points: 1) on the road net from Syria; 2) down the Tigris; 3) and around Ramadi.

If Ramadi had an octagon shaped, one kilometer wide, dry moat surrounding the urban city, would Ramadi in effect become a tightly controlled island with only a hand full of ways in or out?  Later, what if moat segments radiated North towards Lake Tharthar?  Or South West?

Using much larger modern earth moving equipment not currently used by the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers, a complete moat system could be constructed in weeks.  With a no cost moat in between two low cost dirt berms, would military officials have an enduring capability to keep insurgents from simply melting away, taking the fight to a new location on another day?

http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7629&Itemid=18

Careful consideration has to be given to the need for graduated response.  The largest mining excavators would make easy work of constructing a huge ditch and very high berm.  To prevent hostages or women and children being drug out on to the flat moat area, the ditch would need to be massive.  It would be both very wide and deep.  The excavated sand would be used to make a steep and high berm, delineating the inside of the moat area.  Wire at the base and wire at the top can be added.  During day light or when using night vision equipment, four men running look very different from four men dragging children through a thirty foot deep ditch.  Carefully trained observers could greatly improve graduated response.  Initially, we may want to just observe and not strike. 

Of subtle importance to understand, the U.S. strikes in the moat segments as a last resort.  

As a first step, just put a few segments in place and do nothing.  Leak to the media scary stories about sniper-rifle 250 bombs, raining down from two miles high day and night, slaughtering everything “trapped” in these diabolical “moat” segments. 

Then do nothing. 

Let the dirt and “the narrative” help the “shaping operations.”

In the main, the goal is to channel insurgent movement and to use these "modern city moat segments" as part of the ground commander's shaping operations. 

If Fallujah is an island in a sea of sand with air weapons killing everything which tries to sneak through the moat system, would clear and hold become a 1,000% more effective?  With out the ability to escape or move, would insurgents left inside the city, one given the moat treatment, be highly vulnerable to the Iraqi Army alone?  Could the U.S. use all weather cameras to remotely monitor the well marked and “innocent civilian proof" moats?  Could 30 or 40 octagon shaped, moat systems be effectively guarded by only two or three orbiting F-16s, especially if the legs on each moat were few in number, straight, long and one kilometer wide?

Should more or fewer U.S. soldiers be in Iraq?   That’s basically settled: There will be no sizable increases in our troop presence, but gradual downsizing, as more provinces must come under Iraqi control and we seek to avert Iraqi perpetual dependence.  Debating how many soldiers should have been deployed in the three-week war of 2003 and its aftermath is about as helpful in the present as fighting over culpability for the surprise at the Battle of the Bulge in 1944.

The City of Rome had many gates.  The gates were seldom closed but they were always watched.  Today, insurgents watch our every move and the U.S. needs additional, low cost capabilities to channel and ultimately monitor insurgent movement.  Controlling the movement of people on the battle space is more critical than the re-supply of guns or shells.  People are the center of gravity.  Guns have been illegal in the District of Columbia for thirty years and we all know how well that has worked out.  Immediately after the shrine bombing, freedom of movement was more important than the mindset of the Shiite population.  Sometimes the Romans had to close the gates.

Moving forward in 2007, let’s remember Bill Clinton proved that the U.S. Air Force could effectively guard “kill zones” in Iraq for 8 years without suffering a single casualty.  Maybe a moat system couple with a graduated response capability is just the help the Iraqi Army needs next month?